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OF
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V.

LA FUENTE

[20 C. (2d)

sary to determine whether one who owns property not exceeding the amount specified by the Old Age Security Law, and
who has refused the offer ofa home with a relative re.~ponsible
under the law for his support, is in indigent circumstances
within the meaning of section 22 of article IV of the Constitution.
,
[5] But even though the recipient of old age security benefits may be entitled to receive the benefits of the law, yet, the
appellant contends, the county should' have no right to reimbursement from a responsible relative when, before the aid
was extended, the relative offered to support the recipient in
his home. Section 2224 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
is complete in itself, and gives a right of action to the county
if the person receiving aid has within the state a spouse or
adult child pecuniarily able to support him. Upon the direction of the designated authorities, recovery may be had of
such portion of the aid advanced as therelative is able to pay.
(County of Lake v. Forbes, 42 CaL App. (2d) 744 [109 P.
(2d) 972].)
The measure of responsibility, as fixed by this statute, is
in terms of money. If, as contended by the appellant, the only
way in which she could' support her parents was in her home
and not by pecuniary assistance, such fact would' constitute an
absolute defense to her liability under the statute. The intention of the Legislature in this regard is also shown by the
1941 amendment to section 2181 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, establishing a relative's maximum contribution
scale based entirely upon the monetary income of the relative
and the number of persons dependent on that income for support, and also providing the board of supervisors with discretion to accept less than the amount established by the scale
in the event of unusual expenses. But there is no evidence of
the appellant's inability to give her parents any financial
assistance other than her own assertion to that effect, unsupported by any testimony as to how her relatively large income
is spent. Under such circumstances, the trial court was clearly
justified in finding that she is able to contribute to the financial support of her parent~ and to reimburse the county for
the aid advanced to them.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Traynor,
J., concurred.
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O. P. WALKER, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF.SAN GABRIEL (a Municipal Corporation) et al."Resp,onden~s.,,:
[1] Administrative Law-Judicial Remedies.~Either certior~ri m,'
mandamus is an appropriate remedy by which to't~sf tli~
prope:, exercise of discretion vested In a local board.
.
.
[2] Licenses-Revocation-Hearing-EvideIlCe.-A board

co.mmit~

an ['.buse of discretion when it revokes a license to conduct a
legitimate business without competent evidence establishing
just cause for revocation. There must be substantial evidence
to support such a ruling; and'in the absence of statute so
providing, hearsay, such as a letter from the chief of police
enumerating. the charges against the licensee, is not competent
evidence to that enu.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Alfred E. Paonessa, Judge pro tem. Reversed.
Certiorari proceeding to annul an order revoking' Ii
license, in which the trial court issued an alternative writ
of mandamus. Judgment of nonsuit reversed.
Keller & Smith and Morris Lavine for Appellant,
Herbert S. Farrell for Respondents.
SHENK, J.-The petitioner applied to. the Superior
Court in Los Angeles County for a writ of certiorari to ann.ul
an order of the city council of the respondent city of San
Gabriel revoking his license to conduct an automobile wrecking business in that city. The trial court issued an alterna~
tivc writ of mandamus as an appropriate step in the pro~
cccding. Issue was joined by the respondents'answer. Afte~
the introduction of oral and documentary evidence the re~
spondents moved for a judgment of nonsuit, which was
[1] See 4 Cal. Jur. 1076.
McK. Dig. References:
censes, § 55.

[1]

Administrative Law;

[2]' Ll~l
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granted. The petitioner appealed. The following are the
facts disclosed at the trial:
For thirteen years prior to January, 1941, the petitioner
had conducted an automobile wrecking business in the city
of San Gabriel. On the 22nd day of that month he received
notice that the city council proposed to revoke his license
to operate his business, and that January 28, 1941, was fixed
as the time for a hearing. An ordinance of the city required
the issuance of a license to engage in the business of automobile wrecking. It provided that such a license be issued
and accepted with the understanding that the city council
might· revoke it upon being satisfied that any term or condition thereof had been violated or that the holder was an unfit person to be entrusted with the privilege granted by the
license. It was expressly provided that before any license
be revoked for any of the reasons stated the holder should
be given an opportunity to be heard by notice in writing
fixing the time for hearing.
On January 28, 1941, the time fixed in the notice, the
petitioner appeared before the city council with his attorney, who informed the members of the council that "Mr.
Walker stood ready, able and willing to produce evidence
and testimony as to why his license should not be revoked,
but should await the evidence of why it should be." Whereupon Police Officer Jorgensen read a letter addressed to the
city council and signed by· the chief of police of. the city.
That letter set forth numerous charges against the petitioner, claimed to be violations of the ordinances of the city
or otherwise deemed sufficient to justify a revocation of the
license.
Thereupon the petitioner was asked if he had anything
to say. His attorney replied that until the persons making
the complaints were produced, and an opportunity given
to cross-examine them, there was no evidence before the city
council and nothing for the petitioner to refute. The city
council offered to continue the hearing to a later date if the
petitioner desired to introduce evidence on his own behalf.
But the petitioner, through his attorney, declined to produce any witnesses until witnesses supporting the charges
made by the chief of police had been produced and subjectt~d
to cross-examination. The city council thereupon revoked
the petitioner's license.
At the trial the suJiiciency of the notice to rCivoke the.
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license and of the fixing of the time for hearing was conceded by the petitioner. His principal contention then and .
now is that the city council acted arbitrarily and committed
an abuse of its discretion when it revoked his license upon
hearsay evidence only.
[1] Either certiorari or mandamus is an appropriate
remedy to test the proper exercise of discretion vested in a
local board. (Garvin v. Ohambers, 195 Cal. 212 [232 Pac.
696] ; Mann v. Tracy, 185 Cal. 272 [196 Pac. 484] ; Dierssen.
v. Oivil Service Oommission, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 53 [110 P.
(2d) 513]; Naughton v. Retirement Board of San Francisco,
43 Cal. App. (2d) 254 [110 P. (2d) 714].)
It is not contended that the provisions of the ordinance
are not in conformity with the requirement of due process
(see Oarroll v. Oalifornia Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal. (2d)
164 [105 P. (2d) 110], and cases cited). But it is claimed
that the city council had no power to revoke the petitioner's
license without a showing of just cause, as defined by the
ordinance, and that the letter from the chief of police, being
hearsay only, did not constitute competent evidence that just
cause existed.
[2] It is well settled that a board commits an abuse of
discretion when it revokes a license to conduct a legitimate
business without competent evidence, establishing just cause
for revocation, and that hearsay evidence alone is. insufficient
to support the revocation of such a llcllnse.. , In JJonsoUdated
Edison 00. v. NatiOnal Labor Relations Board, 305 U.. S.
197 [59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126], ~e Supreme Court pf
the United States observed at page 230 that ,the. i, assurap.ce
of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does p.ot
go so far as to justify orders without a. basis in evidence
having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substap.tlal.evidence.' 1 Th~~e
must be substantial evidence to support such a. board's rUling, and hearsay, unless specially perniitted by statute,. is
not competent evidence to that end. (See Englebretson: ~.
Ind1~trial Acc. Com., 170 Cal. 793 [151 Pac. 421J; Em:
ployers Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 170 Cal.
800 [151 Pac. 423] ; State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Indus
trial Ace. Com., 195 Cal. 174 [231 Pac. 996] ; Smith v. Board
of Police Commissioners, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 292 ,[35 P. (2d)
555, 36 P. (2d) 670]; Dyment v. Boal'd of MedicaZ Exam·
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iners, 93 Cal. App. 65 [268 Pac. 1073] ; Thrasher v. Board of
Medical Exarniners, 44 Cal. App. 26 [185 Pac. 1006].)
There' was no evidence before the city council on the
hearing to revoke the petitioner's license except the letter
froni the chief of pulice enumerating the charges against the
petitioner. It was on that evidence alone that the council
purported to revoke his license. The letter was competent
only as a statement of the charges against the petitioner, but
was not competent evidence 01= the truth of the charges stated
'therein. In the absence of competent proof of the charges
against the petitioner the city council was without power to
revoke his license and therefore abused its discretion in" doing so.
The judgment is reversed.
Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Peters, J. pro tem.; concurred.

'L

I.:jl

TRAYNOR, J;,Concurring.-The city council did not
reserve the power to rilvoke licenses at its discretion. It
reserved the power to revoke, if it adjudged, after a hearing
on the law and' the facts, that a legal ground for revocation
was established. The ordinance vested the adjudicating
function in the council and prescribed that it should be
exercised only after a hearing. It is sufficient to hold that
the hearing intended was an adversary hearing, at which
evidence was to be taken and a decision made, based on that
evidence. The city had the burden of establishing its case,
and until it introduced evidence the defendant licensee
rightly took the position that there was no evidence to rebut.
The majority opinion correctly characterizes the letter read
by the police officer as a recital of the charges. The caSe may
be disposed of simply on the ground that no hearing on
these charges was had. If, however, the paper is to be regarded as evidence, it is clearly hearsay that would be inadmissible in a court trial if proper objection were made. In
administrative hearings hearsay commonly is admissible even
over objections (Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed;], vol. 1, §§4-b,
4-c), and the court does not now decide that it is not. What
the court decides is that, in the absence of statutes to the
contrary, there is no substantial e~idence to support an administrative decision if the only evidence is hearsay. Accordingly, the majority opinion assumes that in reviewing the
decision' of a local administrative tribunal with respect to
a disputed issue of fact the trial court can go no further
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than to inquire if the administrative tribunal h:~d"beforeit '
any substantial evidence to support its decisiori.,"wheth~:rJhe
review is by mandamus or by certiorari.,' ,'::'; ',"~,i,
The opinion cites with approval Dierssen
'aip~'Z' '~ervic6
Oommission, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 53 [110 P; (2d)' ~131; alld
Naughton v. Retirement Board of San F'ranciSc6; ,43 ',9~.
App. (2d) 254 [HO P. (2d) 714]. TliefuSt'caaeheld'that
anyone attacking the decision of a local' adjlldicati,ng )oard
by petition. for mandate must 'allege"that ,tlle b~~q' 'a~~.~
fraudulently, capriciously, or arbitrarily, and that,ILch,arg~
againilt theboard's decision of issues of fac~isn~(su!!l~~e4
if the board had any substantial evidence before it: 'to sustain
its decision. The second case cited follo~e<l't~e:same, nil~~ ,
The majority voted to annul the decision, of the 'b,oard o~
the g1'ound that there was no evidence in the record to sup~
port the board's finding. Peters, J., concUrring, iiaid: i'U
mandamus is used, the extent of the 'review' is to determi,:iie;
its pointed out in the main opinion, whether'theloca.lboard
has acted arbitrarily and clearly in a.buse of'its ,discretion.'
So far as the evidence is concerned, that means that the
superior court's power is limited to determining whether
there is any substantial evidence to support ,tli~ :(indi~gs of
the board. There is no doubt that the cases ,hold,aS stateq,
in the main opinion, that mandamus may be 'uSed by the
aggrieved party. Whichever remedy is used, so far, as the
evidence is concerned, the extent of the 'review' is exactly
the same."
Why permit mandamus to be extended to reach a result
that would have been reached by certiorari' It would be
better to preserve the traditional distinctions, between the
two writs. In this instance certiorari was clearly the ap~
plicable writ. (Garvin v. Ohambers, 195 Cal. ,212'[232 p'ac.
696] ; Legault v. Board of TrUstees, 161 Cal. i9,7,'[11S Pac.
706, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519]; Murray v. SUpervisors, 23
Cal. 492, 493; Nider v. Oity Oommission, 36 Oal.1\.pp. (2d)
14 [97 P. (2d) 293]; Rigdon v. Oommon Oouncil, 30 Cal.
App. 107 [157 Pac. 513]; Great Western Power 00. v:
Supervisors, 21 Cal. App. 146 [131 Pac. 88].) On certiorari
the' court would have directed the council to' certify up the
record of its proceedings, and would readily have determined
whether that record showed that the council had before it
any substantial evidence to support its decision. Instead,
the court, proceeding by mandamus, permitted persons who
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were present at the council meeting to testify as to what
occurred there and to give oral evidence as to what evidence
was presented at the council meeting. Counsel for the city
objected that the best evidence rule was thereby violated,
but the objection was overruled. If the record of the hearing before the council had been introduced, as it should have
been, the court would then have been in the same position
as if it had proceeded by certiorari.
While the law thus seems to be settled in this state that
local agencies may exercise adjudicating powers and that
their decisions are respected by courts if there is subst.antial
evidence to Support them, it is anomalous that the Legislature is without power to put the decision of state boards
on the same footing. In Laisne v. California State Board of
Optometry, 19 Cal. (2d) 831 [123 P. (2d) 457], a majority
of this court held that it would be an unconstitutional vesting of judicial power in a state board to give any degree
of finality to its decision of issues of fact in the revocation
of a professional license. In consequence, there must be a
complete judicial retrial of its fact decisions. The objections
to that doctrine are set forth at length in the dissenting
opinion in the Laisne case. The majority opinion there concluded that such constitutional judicial power could be vested
in local administrative bodies and that the exercise of such
power could be controlled, as to local boards, by the writ
of certiorari. (Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, supra, p. 847.) The inconsistency in characterizing the
revocation of a license by a state-wide board as ministerial
and reviewable by mandamus, while the same function when
performed by a local board would be judicial and reviewable by certiorari, has been pointed out in the Laisne dissent and elsewhere. (La,isne v. California State Board of
Optometry, supra, p. 869; see Elliott, Certiorari and the
Local Board [1941], 29 Cal. L. Rev. 586, 598; McGovney,
Court Review of Administrative Decisions [1942], 15 So. Cal.
L. Rcv. 391, 409; Turrentine, Restore Certiorari to Review the
Acts of State-Wide Administrative Bodies in California [1941],
29 Cal. L. Rev. 275; [1937] 25 Cal. L. Rev. 694, 704.)
If the writ of certiorari lies to review the revocation of
petitioner's license by the local board in the present case,
it would follow under the majority opinion in the Laisne
case that an exercise of constitutional judicial power is involved. Upon what ground, then, can it be held consistently
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that the writ of mandate is available 1 There is no refusal
to perform a ministerial duty or absence of an adequate remedy, as in Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors &Embalmers, 13 Cal. (2d) 75 [87 P. (2d) 848]. (See Laisne
v. California state Board of Optometry, supra, p. 833.) The
only plausible explanation for the extension of mandate to
review the acts of local boards seems to be the unexpressed
recognition that it is irrational to hold that a particular
activity, the revocation of licenses, is nonjudicial and reviewable exclusively by mandate when the revocation is by a
state-wide board and still adhere to the older doctrine that
it is a judicial function and reviewable by certiorari exclusively when the revocation is by a local agency.
If it were contended that the record of the city council's
hearing disclosed that it had before it other evidence supporting its decision than that disclosed by the testimony
in the trial court, there would be no alternative but to remand the case to the trial court, with instructions to issue
a writ of certiorari. Since it appears, however, that in the
trial court counsel for the city did not contend that the
city council had before it any other evidence, it seems that
the result would have been the same had the' case been tried
on certiorari. Consequently, it is unnecessary to dissent
from the judgment.
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.

rCrim. No. 4425. In Bank. Sept. 29, 1942.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROY J. PUTNAM,
Appellant.
[1] Lewdness-Preliminary Proceedings-Probable Oause.-Rcns-

on able or probable cause for the commitment· of a defendant
is established where at a preliminary hearing atwelve-yearold boy testifies that the defendant felt his private parts,
where his mother corroborated the fact of his making a comMcK. Dig. References: [1] Lewdness, § 7; [2] .Criminal Law,
§ 686; [3] Criminal Law, § 717j [4] Criminal Law, § 686jLewdness,
§ 19; [5] Lewdness, § 21.

